lazy is he who
uses the phone's guitar app
to jam with the bugs
Showing posts with label haiku. Show all posts
Showing posts with label haiku. Show all posts
20210609
20210603
second cicada haiku, recollecting a visit to haight street*
you can fuck in the
honeysuckle just don't ask
for any money
20210518
the cicadaning
the forsythia
blossoms wings & soft bodies
under midnight dew
crouching out there in the dark one can hear them wetly moving all around. the amber nymphs struggle through the dewy grass. and crackle underfoot.
20170921
20150510
queried, if and when
government admits
computers search all records
to match a search term
that the search is con-
ducted by a machine might
lessen intrusion
does not deprive of
standing to object to col-
lection and review
government collects
appellants'metadata
associations
appellants' members'
int'rests in keeping private
chilling at that point
not as usual
a particular subject;
a vast data bank
lawsuits challenging
government's expansive use
not contemplated
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/NSA_ca2_20150507.pdf
computers search all records
to match a search term
that the search is con-
ducted by a machine might
lessen intrusion
does not deprive of
standing to object to col-
lection and review
government collects
appellants'metadata
associations
appellants' members'
int'rests in keeping private
chilling at that point
not as usual
a particular subject;
a vast data bank
lawsuits challenging
government's expansive use
not contemplated
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/NSA_ca2_20150507.pdf
20141123
realists of a larger reality (update: po'ts and p'ets?)
we will need writers- found haiku; dropped by Ursula Le Guin, receiving National Book Foundation Award, Nov. 19.
who can remember freedom:
poets, vis'naries.
bonus:
poet is a tough word:
syllable count a challenge
to any poet
(also it is hard
to elide either vowel
and convey that word)
20140916
shiverin' under the long, icy reach where law used to be
when, having read the entirety of the sentence beginning "It is safe to say that...," in a 2005 document stamped "SECRET//NOFORN//MR" and bearing instructions that it is not to be declassified for another sixteen years, i am at last confronted with the chilling effect of the icy reach of that most transparent administration ever: is it safe to say it, or is it secret, subject to national security censure (e.g., the headbag and gastric tube treatment)?
lets find out:
lets find out:
20140710
on the practical preeminence of immanence and influence imputed
no US person
solely on first amendment
activities, such
as staging rallies,
writing critical essays,
expressing beliefs;
no US person
solely on advocacy
of the use of force;
no US lawyer
solely for representing
suspicious clients;
no US person
solely for being muslim
may be targeted,
but maybe in some
suggestive combination
of the foregoing
plus probable cause
of foreign pow'r influence
and dire immanence
alleged before the
FISA court official's sure
rubber stamp assent.
we are left, again, with questions and obfuscatory nonanswers by nominally responsible parties.
foremost in my mind, parsing the propaganda and ratiocination, are: how are "foreign power" and "immanence" defined these days? are they defined at all? i understand that the notion of immanence in the context of customary and traditional international law of war has proved somewhat pliable over the last fifteen or so years; is this the same notion of immanence? are anonymous, or wikileaks or the tor network foreign powers? are Al Haramain and CAIR foreign powers? how about The Guardian and FirstLook Media? or are foreign powers solely states, as seems to be the case in recent application of the aforementioned body of international law?
meanwhile, there's been a good deal of disturbing disclosure in the German press lately: see, e.g., spiegel, and spiegel and der erste.
and, it is interesting to note, Faisal Gill and Asim Ghafoor, two of the disclosed subjects of the disclosed surveillance, when asked whether these disclosures would lead them to sue the government, told Amy Goodman this morning that it is up to the Congress to exercise control because there are no judicial remedies available. Ghafoor would know.
solely on first amendment
activities, such
as staging rallies,
writing critical essays,
expressing beliefs;
no US person
solely on advocacy
of the use of force;
no US lawyer
solely for representing
suspicious clients;
no US person
solely for being muslim
may be targeted,
but maybe in some
suggestive combination
of the foregoing
plus probable cause
of foreign pow'r influence
and dire immanence
alleged before the
FISA court official's sure
rubber stamp assent.
we are left, again, with questions and obfuscatory nonanswers by nominally responsible parties.
foremost in my mind, parsing the propaganda and ratiocination, are: how are "foreign power" and "immanence" defined these days? are they defined at all? i understand that the notion of immanence in the context of customary and traditional international law of war has proved somewhat pliable over the last fifteen or so years; is this the same notion of immanence? are anonymous, or wikileaks or the tor network foreign powers? are Al Haramain and CAIR foreign powers? how about The Guardian and FirstLook Media? or are foreign powers solely states, as seems to be the case in recent application of the aforementioned body of international law?
meanwhile, there's been a good deal of disturbing disclosure in the German press lately: see, e.g., spiegel, and spiegel and der erste.
and, it is interesting to note, Faisal Gill and Asim Ghafoor, two of the disclosed subjects of the disclosed surveillance, when asked whether these disclosures would lead them to sue the government, told Amy Goodman this morning that it is up to the Congress to exercise control because there are no judicial remedies available. Ghafoor would know.
20140520
selectively retrieve content: validate conclusions: profit!
the other day, when the Intercept announced it was hiring senior editorial staff, reporters and bloggers, i started drafting, and have, by now, transmitted a cover letter requesting consideration, in which i told them, among other things, about all the good times we have had over the years here, Dear Reader, at Hellmark Press; now i feel a little inhibited.
but i did tell them that i've been assiduously reading their work and those documents they disclose, and doing my best here to consider and react to them, even if only by linking to them via intercepted-language haiku, as is often all i have to offer at a given moment (as well as another small, habituated step in my own long practice), so i cannot simply fall silent here, particularly when such a shockingly comprehensive program as SOMALGET, getting all mobile calls in the Bahamas(!) and, ahem, several other countries, has been revealed there in what may be the Intercept's finest piece of long journalism to date, by Devereaux, Greenwald and Poitras. nice work!
i stayed up too late reading the documents and counting syllables, but alas had to paraphrase to produce
leaving the one country redacted may have the beneficial effect of allowing all the client states, who were not named, to twist and cringe and sweat it out and wonder "is it us?" and order a thorough inventory of data security by the corporate contractors hired by states to see to such things, for a while.
the story itself (read it yourself!) is that the spy agency exploited access points opened to representatives of the DEA by the Bahamas pursuant to routine drug (and human trafficing) interdiction cooperation, and now obtains full call records and content, which is then made available for law enforcement to plumb. and the story briefly alludes to the curious silence of the documents on the question of financial crimes in the Bahamas.
that silence is curious. for almost a year now (and longer!), we've been reading of the NSA's thorough penetration of networks, and focusing on telecoms and public internet properties. clearly this is where we the people enjoy a lot of our expressive associations and producing and collaborating in the production of papers and effects, the traditional objects of privacy protections; occasionally, there is talk of the erosion or deliberate salting of encryption standards leading to vulnerabilities in the security mechanisms of the websites of the banks with which we, as users, do business.
but several additional networks, living almost invisibly on and parallel to the Internet, immediately spring to mind at the mention of the telecom programs' silence on the question of financial data and misadventure. surely the NSA has not overlooked these networks, but they would almost certainly be pursued under different programs.
i wonder if such documents are among the Snowden trove, and remain, yet to be explosively reported. can you imagine the NSA shaing SIGINT with the SEC like they reportedly do with the DEA?
but i did tell them that i've been assiduously reading their work and those documents they disclose, and doing my best here to consider and react to them, even if only by linking to them via intercepted-language haiku, as is often all i have to offer at a given moment (as well as another small, habituated step in my own long practice), so i cannot simply fall silent here, particularly when such a shockingly comprehensive program as SOMALGET, getting all mobile calls in the Bahamas(!) and, ahem, several other countries, has been revealed there in what may be the Intercept's finest piece of long journalism to date, by Devereaux, Greenwald and Poitras. nice work!
i stayed up too late reading the documents and counting syllables, but alas had to paraphrase to produce
host countries are notand mix a bit to get
aware of [the] collection
using these systems
our covert missioni tried not to speculate too much on the identity of that redacted country; i did not follow up on the redaction flap on twitter until this evening, when i did read a couple silly and incomplete accounts written, it turns out, by detractors of both involved principals, and all their end of the political spectrum, and decided to look no further. i'm not sure i'm ready to be edified by a twitter debate on ethics, or by what other twitterers and bloggers make of it anyway; maybe Amy Goodman will have Slavoj Žižek and Reggie Watts come in to the studio to break it down for the donors someday soon. i hope so.
retrospective retrieval
is the provision
leaving the one country redacted may have the beneficial effect of allowing all the client states, who were not named, to twist and cringe and sweat it out and wonder "is it us?" and order a thorough inventory of data security by the corporate contractors hired by states to see to such things, for a while.
the story itself (read it yourself!) is that the spy agency exploited access points opened to representatives of the DEA by the Bahamas pursuant to routine drug (and human trafficing) interdiction cooperation, and now obtains full call records and content, which is then made available for law enforcement to plumb. and the story briefly alludes to the curious silence of the documents on the question of financial crimes in the Bahamas.
that silence is curious. for almost a year now (and longer!), we've been reading of the NSA's thorough penetration of networks, and focusing on telecoms and public internet properties. clearly this is where we the people enjoy a lot of our expressive associations and producing and collaborating in the production of papers and effects, the traditional objects of privacy protections; occasionally, there is talk of the erosion or deliberate salting of encryption standards leading to vulnerabilities in the security mechanisms of the websites of the banks with which we, as users, do business.
but several additional networks, living almost invisibly on and parallel to the Internet, immediately spring to mind at the mention of the telecom programs' silence on the question of financial data and misadventure. surely the NSA has not overlooked these networks, but they would almost certainly be pursued under different programs.
i wonder if such documents are among the Snowden trove, and remain, yet to be explosively reported. can you imagine the NSA shaing SIGINT with the SEC like they reportedly do with the DEA?
20140502
echobase are belong to us, but sometimes we share
identifiers
of possible interest:
there are too many.
compliance can be
inserted at batch result
and query levels
or wherever else;
compliance is the last thing
we're worried about.
brought to you by The Intercept.
Also, the Munk Debate between Glenn Greenwald with Alexis Ohanian and Michael Hayden with Alan Dershowitz, concerning the poorly-phrased* resolution that "State surveillance is a legitimate defense of our freedoms," is just wrapping up. It appears to be a little too soon for archival video to be accessible, but I'll post it when I can find it. (well: here it is at The Intercept).
Poorly phrased, as it states an all-or-nothing proposition, when it is clear that some state surveillance -- that conducted within and according to the rule of laws about which all subjects may be similarly informed -- is clearly legitimate and within the traditional roles of government, and similarly clear that any surveillance that is conducted beyond that law undermines those freedoms its proponents claim to defend. "Our freedoms" might also benefit from some definition.
of possible interest:
there are too many.
compliance can be
inserted at batch result
and query levels
or wherever else;
compliance is the last thing
we're worried about.
brought to you by The Intercept.
Also, the Munk Debate between Glenn Greenwald with Alexis Ohanian and Michael Hayden with Alan Dershowitz, concerning the poorly-phrased* resolution that "State surveillance is a legitimate defense of our freedoms," is just wrapping up. It appears to be a little too soon for archival video to be accessible, but I'll post it when I can find it. (well: here it is at The Intercept).
Poorly phrased, as it states an all-or-nothing proposition, when it is clear that some state surveillance -- that conducted within and according to the rule of laws about which all subjects may be similarly informed -- is clearly legitimate and within the traditional roles of government, and similarly clear that any surveillance that is conducted beyond that law undermines those freedoms its proponents claim to defend. "Our freedoms" might also benefit from some definition.
20140417
leaky whistle gets another drop in sea, tom choked out
Ali Watkins, Jonathan Landay and Marisa Taylor, over at McClatchey, recently came into possession of, and published, what they describe as the conclusions of the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on its investigation into the CIA's detention and interrogation program.
According to the conclusions, the detention and interrogation program suffered several systemic faults, starting with the flawed utilitarian premise – "The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques did not effectively assist the agency in acquiring intelligence or in gaining cooperation from detainees" – juxtaposed against its stark moral valence: "The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques [and] the conditions of confinement of detainees of the CIA were brutal and far worse than the agency communicated to policymakers."
The balance of findings concern the agency's "deeply flawed" management, poor preparation and record-keeping, failure to heed internal critiques and objections, failure to evaluate program effectiveness, failure to reprimand or hold accountable persons "responsible for serious violations, inappropriate behavior, or management failures", the use of unapproved techniques, and operation of the program so as to complicate and hinder the national security missions of other agencies, while consistently mischaracterizing the program and its effectiveness, impeding proper legal analysis by providing inaccurate information, and similarly impeding oversight and decision-making of the White House, Congress and its own Office of the Inspector General.
Just when you thought "contract attorney" or "contract sales representative" might signify the vilest job suitable for the vilest people, new horizons open: the findings note that the CIA's detention and interrogation program was designed by two "contract psychologists," although that aspect was later outsourced. (One wonders, first, how "contract psychologists" differ from "outsourced", and, second, "outsourced" . . . to whom?)
Finally, "The CIA manipulated the media by coordinating the release of classified information, which inaccurately portrayed the effectiveness of the agency's enhanced interrogation techniques."
That last bit seems strangely, discomfitingly, familiar . . .
interrogations,
conditions of confinement:
brutal and far worse
Watkins et al. note, the twenty findings "paint a picture of an intelligence agency that seemed intent on evading or misleading nearly all of its oversight mechanisms throughout the program," which, in fairness, sounds just like every other intelligence program. As I opined last month:
The ethos of an organization flows from the top: The current executives of all agencies thrived and excelled as the Executive department's abuses and unaccountability gained momentum, and were propelled to the top of their uniquely sensitive, secretive and powerful organizations under those conditions, as those organizations enacted programs skirting laws or, later requiring laws to be rewritten. In many cases the very infrastructure of the agencies was specifically reorganized to better fit the views and designs of unaccountable leadership. Now, they are relied upon to brief the qualified senators and judges concerning intelligence activities, even when they make assertions concerning how, previously, they had misled.
The chair of the committee, the principal proponent of the publication of [selections from] the report [subject to the direction of the White House with the advice and consent of the CIA], calls for the prosecution of the party responsible for this leak. One can only imagine that, if there were not so much water still sloshing around the decks from that agency's liberal and zealous efforts to apply enhanced interrogation techniques to unpersons under its control, there probably would not be such steady leaking now; nor would each leak make such a splash as it drops.
According to the conclusions, the detention and interrogation program suffered several systemic faults, starting with the flawed utilitarian premise – "The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques did not effectively assist the agency in acquiring intelligence or in gaining cooperation from detainees" – juxtaposed against its stark moral valence: "The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques [and] the conditions of confinement of detainees of the CIA were brutal and far worse than the agency communicated to policymakers."
The balance of findings concern the agency's "deeply flawed" management, poor preparation and record-keeping, failure to heed internal critiques and objections, failure to evaluate program effectiveness, failure to reprimand or hold accountable persons "responsible for serious violations, inappropriate behavior, or management failures", the use of unapproved techniques, and operation of the program so as to complicate and hinder the national security missions of other agencies, while consistently mischaracterizing the program and its effectiveness, impeding proper legal analysis by providing inaccurate information, and similarly impeding oversight and decision-making of the White House, Congress and its own Office of the Inspector General.
Just when you thought "contract attorney" or "contract sales representative" might signify the vilest job suitable for the vilest people, new horizons open: the findings note that the CIA's detention and interrogation program was designed by two "contract psychologists," although that aspect was later outsourced. (One wonders, first, how "contract psychologists" differ from "outsourced", and, second, "outsourced" . . . to whom?)
Finally, "The CIA manipulated the media by coordinating the release of classified information, which inaccurately portrayed the effectiveness of the agency's enhanced interrogation techniques."
That last bit seems strangely, discomfitingly, familiar . . .
All in all, you gotta give them credit for maintaining such a seemingly seamlessly effective obfuscation and misinformation edifice, that persists nigh impenetrably even unto the present moment, notwithstanding all the apparently incompetent program management and implementation: Without records how do they know which misrepresentations they have represented to which of the many would-be authorizing or oversight authorities?
20140312
two(more)500ths (... yes, and MC HAMMERSTEIN) ... ( ... (...alas))
dear reader, i do not really have one thousand (formerly) blank white cards, but i have quite a few (and there must be hundreds more lovingly cached in drawers or storage units by those i've played against). i post these in salute of the marking of another orbit of the sun achieved by that dear distant benefactor or benefactress who sent those blank white cards last month.
20140224
The 4 Ds: disrupted deceptions degrading denial (and the 180 Gs*)
Magick - "the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will."
- Crowley
Magic - a World War II cryptanalysis program.
Magic Techniques and Experiment Effects - "Using online techniques to make something happen in the real or cyber world."
- Name of Serious
Crime Effects chief [redacted]
to protect [not you].
GCHQ, a
presumptive expert on harm
to reputation.
Discredit target:
vandalize social network;
set honey-trap.
Discredit business:
leak confidential info
to competitors.
information ops
and technical disruption
covertly, online.
legend building and
alias management were
not part of training.
biological
and social compassion cues:
how can i game these?
*
the honeypot here
is now Anonymous may
ape and escalate
*
...how is Booz Allen
Hamilton's reputation
holding up these days?
*
whatever else you
do today, don't forget to
Conform and Obey
(*the 180 Gs)
- Crowley
Magic - a World War II cryptanalysis program.
Magic Techniques and Experiment Effects - "Using online techniques to make something happen in the real or cyber world."
- Name of Serious
Crime Effects chief [redacted]
to protect [not you].
GCHQ, a
presumptive expert on harm
to reputation.
Discredit target:
vandalize social network;
set honey-trap.
Discredit business:
leak confidential info
to competitors.
information ops
and technical disruption
covertly, online.
legend building and
alias management were
not part of training.
biological
and social compassion cues:
how can i game these?
the honeypot here
is now Anonymous may
ape and escalate
*
...how is Booz Allen
Hamilton's reputation
holding up these days?
*
whatever else you
do today, don't forget to
Conform and Obey
(*the 180 Gs)
20140220
20140218
the dear new normal
the future is the
NSA peering up its
own asshole ... and yours
dear mr. clapper:
if you're doing nothing wrong
why fight to hide it?
dear mr. baker:
why lie and filibuster
if ellsberg misstates?
anticrisis girl
to passively trawl networks
"gee!" - no: GTE.
bloggers, journalists
malicious foreign targets -
why do they hate us?
*
from this moment on
the word "journal" is to be
pronounced "tɛrər"
(as in "glenn greenwald
and jeremy scahill are
both great journalists"
(or "chelsea manning
and julian assange are
journal masterminds"
(also, alas, as
in "i try to write in my
journal every day" ;)
*
my bits are dirty
minimization will be
of no use to me.
*
. . . hmm. on reflection and, admittedly, somewhat lamely:
"i try to write in my journal every day," tom reported suspicious activities.
NSA peering up its
own asshole ... and yours
dear mr. clapper:
if you're doing nothing wrong
why fight to hide it?
dear mr. baker:
why lie and filibuster
if ellsberg misstates?
anticrisis girl
to passively trawl networks
"gee!" - no: GTE.
bloggers, journalists
malicious foreign targets -
why do they hate us?
*
from this moment on
the word "journal" is to be
pronounced "tɛrər"
(as in "glenn greenwald
and jeremy scahill are
both great journalists"
(or "chelsea manning
and julian assange are
journal masterminds"
(also, alas, as
in "i try to write in my
journal every day" ;)
*
my bits are dirty
minimization will be
of no use to me.
*
. . . hmm. on reflection and, admittedly, somewhat lamely:
"i try to write in my journal every day," tom reported suspicious activities.
20140211
20140205
ex vitro trifecta
took a step & slipped
looks like good ol' Wintry Mick's
up to his old tricks
also: "I counted on it being icy," Tom let slip.
looks like good ol' Wintry Mick's
up to his old tricks
also: "I counted on it being icy," Tom let slip.
20130905
20130825
IO GIGO dido
quarterly IO
NSAW SID
report summary
Some authorities under which surveillance and oversight cited in leaked linked report are conducted:
Mobile Communications
roamer incidents
growth attributed
to spike in Chinese travel
for lunar new year
roamers: there was no
previous indications
of the planned travel
incidents could be
reduced if analysts had
more target info
NSAW SID
report summary
Some authorities under which surveillance and oversight cited in leaked linked report are conducted:
FISAGlobal System for
Fisa Amendments 702, 704, 705(b)
EO 12333
Dod Reg 5240.1-R
NSA/CSS Policy 1-23
USSID SP0018
related policies and regulations.
Mobile Communications
roamer incidents
growth attributed
to spike in Chinese travel
for lunar new year
roamers: there was no
previous indications
of the planned travel
incidents could be
reduced if analysts had
more target info
20130821
unconsenting US persons minimized!
So, maybe you heard that the Electronic Frontier Foundation via FOIA obtained a copy of Judge Bates' October 3, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
I must first, one professional to another, recognize and salute some very fine and apparently thorough redacts-personship: Nicely redacted yo'!
the court's review is
complicated by recent
state revelations
upstream collection
may acquire just a single
message or contain
multiple discrete
communications of no
collection target
fundamentally
shifting the Court's view of the
scope of collection
must reexamine
presumptions underlying
prior approvals
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